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The purpose of contract remedies is to place a disappointed promisee
in as good a position as he would have enjoyed had his promisor per-
formed.' Contract law has two methods of achieving this "compensation
goal": requiring the breaching party to pay damages, either to enable
the promisee to purchase a substitute performance, or to replace the net
gains that the promised performance would have generated; or requir-
ing the breaching party to render the promised performance. Although
the damages remedy is always available to a disappointed promisee
under current law, the remedy of specific performance is available only
at the discretion of the court. Moreover, courts seldom enforce contract
clauses that explicitly provide for specific performance in the event of
breach.
This Article argues that the remedy of specific performance should
be as routinely available as the damages remedy. Part I reviews the
current doctrine governing specific performance. Part II argues that
the damage remedy is undercompensatory more often than is generally
supposed and establishes that promisees have economic incentives not
to elect specific performance unless the damage remedy is likely not to
provide adequate compensation. Thus, expanding the availability of
specific performance would not give promisees an incentive to exploit
breaching promisors. Part III goes on to show that making specific
performance generally available is unlikely to result in the efficiency
losses predicted by other commentators.2 Part IV argues that expand-
t Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. This Article bene-
fited greatly from comments received at faculty workshops held at U.S.C. and Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, and at a graduate economics seminar at the California Institute
of Technology. David W. Carroll, Melvin A. Eisenberg, Robert C. Ellickson, Julius G.
Getman, Stephen J. Morse, Richard A. Posner, Margaret Jane Radin, Robert E. Scott,
and Louis L. Wilde also made helpful comments on prior drafts.
1. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1972 version) ("remedies . . . shall be liberally adminis-
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed .. "); REsTATEMIENT OF CONraACTS § 329 (1932) (same) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT].
2. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 88-89 (2d ed. 1977) (defending cur-
rent law on efficiency grounds); Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351
(1978) (same); Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 247 (1979).
The only modern commentator to criticize specific performance law seriously is Professor
Dawson, who has called for the specific performance of all contracts to deliver chattels.
See Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. Rav. 495, 532
(1959). Professor Dawson, however, did not deal with efficiency objections to the wider
availability of specific performance.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 271, 1979
ing the availability of specific performance would not unduly restrict
the liberty interests of promisors. Finally, Part V argues that defenses
not available in an action for damages should be eliminated or severely
restricted in their application to actions for specific performance.3
I. The Current Law Regarding Specific Performance
Under current law, courts grant specific performance when they
perceive that damages will be inadequate compensation. Specific per-
formance is deemed an extraordinary remedy, awarded at the court's
discretion:
[I]t must be remembered that specific performance is not a
matter of right, even when the plaintiff's evidence establishes a
contract valid at law and sufficient for the recovery of damages.
Ordering specific enforcement of a contract is a matter within
the sound judicial discretion of the court .... [T]he plaintiff was
required to show the good faith and equities of its own position,
and the trial chancellor, in weighing the equities, was entitled to
consider whether a decree of specific performance would work
an unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff or would result in
injustice.4
The paradigm cases in which the specific performance remedy is cur-
rently granted include sales of "unique goods," in which substitu-
tional damages are difficult to compute; sales of land, because land is
3. This Article omits consideration of several interesting facets of the specific per-
formance question. First, a personal services contract is enforced by an injunction pre-
venting the promisor from performing elsewhere rather than by an injunction requiring
the promisor to perform. See RESTATEMENT § 379. This rule rests partly on the difficulty
of supervising the promisor's performance, but primarily on the promisor's liberty interest
in not being compelled to work at a particular job. See pp. 296-97 infra. Second, contracts
in a family context, such as separation agreements, are sometimes specifically enforce-
able. Third, a seller usually cannot obtain specific performance of the price if the buyer
has not accepted the goods, whereas vendors of land can sue for the price of unaccepted
property. This Article does not analyze sellers' remedies; its concern is with cases in
which the purchasers of goods, realty or services sue for specific performance. Fourth,
expanding specific performance may raise questions concerning the availability of jury
trials because suits for specific performance may be regarded as actions in equity.
4. Public Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. App. 1966); accord,
Green, Inc. v. Smith, 40 Ohio App. 2d 30, 39, 317 N.E.2d 227, 233 (1974). The current
Restatement retains this rule. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 371(1) (Tent.
Draft No. 14, 1979) ("[S]pecific performance of a contract duty will be granted in the
discretion of the court against a party who has committed or is threatening to commit
a breach of the duty") [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
5. See, e.g., Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1972) (specifically en-
forcing contract for sale of business as each business is deemed unique); U.C.C. § 2-716(1)




presumed unique;6 and, more recently, long-term requirements con-
tracts, for which damages from breach are hard to calculate. 7
A disappointed promisee who is able to show that he has no adequate
remedy at law nevertheless is not assured of obtaining specific perfor-
mance. Promisors can raise a number of defenses against specific per-
formance that are not available against a damages award: inadequacy
of consideration; 8 lack of security for the promisee's performance; 9 the
promisor's unilateral mistake; 10 and the difficulty a court would have
in supervising a specific performance decree." These defenses serve to
restrict further the availability of the specific performance remedy.
Further, courts currently refuse to enforce contracts providing for
remedies different from those that they would grant. Liquidated dam-
age clauses with sufficiently high damage provisions would in effect
guarantee performance by the promisor because the costs to him of
breach would always exceed the costs of performance. However, courts
will not enforce such clauses; liquidated damage clauses are enforced
only if they reflect a "reasonable" forecast of "actual" damages-the
damages courts would grant if there were no liquidated damage
clauses in the contracts.' 2 In addition, courts seldom enforce contract
6. See, e.g., Henderson v. Fisher, 286 Cal. App. 2d 468, 473, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177
(1965); Gethsemane Lutheran Church v. Zacho, 258 Minn. 438, 443, 104 NAV.2d 645, 648
(1960).
7. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 3, 40 (8th Cir. 1975); Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 442-43 (S.D. Fla. 1975); cf. U.C.C.
§ 2-716 (Comment 2) (requirements contracts considered "unique goods").
8. See, e.g., Loeb v. Wilson, 253 Cal. App. 2d 883, 388, 61 Cal. Rptr. 877, 380 (1967);
Schlegel v. Moorhead, 170 Mont. 391, 553 P.2d 1009 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §
378(1)(c). But see note 78 infra (citing cases in which specific performance granted de-
spite inadequacy of consideration). In some states, this defense is statutory. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3391.1 (West 1970). Some state courts allow the defense only if the inadequacy
is so great as to constitute fraud. See, e.g., Shepard v. Dick, 203 Kan. 164, 169, 453 P.2d
134, 138 (1969); Banner v. Elm, 251 Md. 694, 697, 248 A.2d 452, 453 (1968). For a criticism
of this more stringent form of the defense, see J., PomRoy, TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF CoNRAcrs 504-07 (3d ed. 1926) (stringent form of defense of little addi-
tional help to courts in deciding when to deny the remedy).
9. See, e.g., Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Alaska 1971); Handy v. Gordon,
65 Cal. 2d 578, 422 P.2d 329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 377.
10. See, e.g., 4500 Suitland Rd. Corp. v. Ciccarello, 269 Md. 444, 452, 306 A.2d 512,
516 (1973); Public Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Mo. App. 1966).
11. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ocean Twelve, Inc., 316 A.2d 573, 575 (Del. Ch. 1973); Yonan
v. Oak Park Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 27 Ill. App. 3d 967, 974, 326 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361 (1919) (enforcing liquidated damage
clause because not disproportionate to property loss); J. Weinstein & Sons, Inc. v. City of
New York, 264 App. Div. 398, 35 N.Y.S.2d 530, aff'd, 289 N.Y. 741, 46 N.E.2d 351 (1942)
(striking down liquidated damages clause as out of proportion to probable damage);
U.C.C. § 2-718(1); C. MCCORMICK, LAw OF DAMeAGES § 149 (1935). Recent commentators
have persuasively criticized these restrictions on the use of liquidated damage clauses.
See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Prin-
ciple: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUm.
L. REV. 554 (1977) (all liquidated damage clauses should be enforceable); Note, A Critique
of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages, 50 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1055 (1977) (same).
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clauses that provide explicitly for specific performance in the event of
breach.'
3
II. Contract Remedies and the Compensation Goal
Specific performance is the most accurate method of achieving the
compensation goal of contract remedies because it gives the promisee
the precise performance that he purchased. 14 The natural question,
then, is why specific performance is not routinely available. 1' Three
explanations of the law's restrictions on specific performance are
possible. First, the law's commitment to the compensation goal may be
less than complete; restricting specific performance may reflect an in-
articulate reluctance to pursue the compensation goal fully. Second,
damages may generally be fully compensatory. In that event, expand-
ing the availability of specific performance would create opportunities
for promisees to exploit promisors by threatening to compel, or actually
compelling, performance, without furthering the compensation goal.
The third explanation is that concerns of efficiency or liberty may
justify restricting specific performance, despite its greater accuracy;
specific performance might generate higher transaction costs than the
damage remedy, or interfere more with the liberty interests of prom-
isors. The first justification is beyond the scope of the analysis here.10
The second and third explanations will be examined in detail.
With respect to the second justification, current doctrine authorizes
13. See, e.g., Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2d 331 (1955); Snell v. Mitchell, 65
Me. 48 (1876). For criticism of this rule, see Kronman, supra note 2, at 371-76; Macneil
Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 520-23 (1962).
14. Admittedly, the equitable remedy does not compensate for the costs of legal delay;
however, such delay is also a feature of actions for damages. Also, inflation partially
offsets the costs of delay for promisees because it enables them to pay in cheaper dollars.
15. One of the earliest English royal writs available to promisees in contract, the writ
of covenant, routinely provided for specific performance. See A. SIMPsoN, A HisToRY OF
THE COMMON LAW OF CoNTRACT 14 (1975) ("[i]n common with other early writs the writ
of covenant . . . seems to be designed not so much to initiate proceedings directed to-
wards compensating the plaintiff for wrong done, as to ensure that what was wrong
should be put right. ). By 1260, however, damages had become the usual remedy
in covenant.
Thereafter, courts of law were authorized only to give damage awards, id. at 595;
courts of equity issued specific performance decrees, but only if there was no adequate
remedy at law, id. at 596. With the merging of law and equity courts into a unified
judicial system, the question arises whether continued restrictions on the availability of
specific performance are still justified.
16. This Article's conclusion that specific performance should be made routinely avail-
able presupposes the desirability of the compensation goal. To deal fully with the claim
that courts should not pursue the compensation goal fully, it would be necessary to for-
mulate both a descriptive theory of why contracts are breached and a normative theory
assessing the reasons for breach in terms of the underlying goals of contract law. Neither
theory exists at present and creating them is beyond the scope of this Article.
274
Vol. 89: 271, 1979
Specific Performance
specific performance when courts cannot calculate compensatory dam-
ages with even a rough degree of accuracy. 17 If the class of cases in
which there are difficulties in computing damages corresponds closely
to the class of cases in which specific performance is now granted, ex-
panding the availability of specific performance is obviously unneces-
sary. Further, such an expansion would create opportunities for prom-
isees to exploit promisors. The class of cases in which damage awards
fail to compensate promisees adequately is, however, broader than the
class of cases in which specific performance is now granted. Thus the
compensation goal supports removing rather than retaining present
restrictions on the availability of specific performance.
It is useful to begin by examining the paradigm case for granting
specific performance under current law, the case of unique goods.' 8
When a promisor breaches and the promisee can make a transaction
that substitutes for the performance the promisor failed to render, the
promisee will be fully compensated if he receives the additional amount
necessary to purchase the substitute plus the costs of making a second
transaction. In some cases, however, such as those involving works of
art, courts cannot identify which transactions the promisee would
regard as substitutes because that information often is in the exclu-
sive possession of the promisee. Moreover, it is difficult for a court
to assess the accuracy of a promisee's claim. For example, if the
promisor breaches a contract to sell a rare emerald, the promisee may
claim that only the Hope Diamond would give him equal satisfaction,
and thus may sue for the price difference between the emerald and the
diamond. It would be difficult for a court to know whether this claim
is true. If the court seeks to award money damages, it has three choices:
granting the price differential, which may overcompensate the prom-
isee; granting the dollar value of the promisee's foregone satisfaction
as estimated by the court, which may overcompensate or undercom-
pensate; or granting restitution of any sums paid, which undercom-
pensates the promisee. The promisee is fully compensated without risk
of overcompensation or undercompensation if the remedy of specific
performance is available to him and its use encouraged by the doctrine
that damages must be foreseeable and certain.' 9
If specific performance is the appropriate remedy in such cases, there
17. See pp. 272-73 and notes 5-7 supra.
18. See, e.g., Copylease Corp. of America v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758, 759
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (unique goods contracts are exception to general rule limiting availability
of specific performance); U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (buyer has right to specific performance in
unique goods case).
19. For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Kronman, supra note 2, at 355-65.
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are three reasons why it should be routinely available. The first reason
is that in many cases damages actually are undercompensatory. Al-
though promisees are entitled to incidental damages,2 0 such damages
are difficult to monetize. They consist primarily of the costs of finding
and making a second deal, which generally involve the expenditure of
time rather than cash; attaching a dollar value to such opportunity
costs is quite difficult. Breach can also cause frustration and anger,
especially in a consumer context, but these costs also are not recover-
able.2
1
Substitution damages, the court's estimate of the amount the prom-
isee needs to purchase an adequate substitute, also may be inaccurate
in many cases less dramatic than the emerald hypothetical discussed
above. This is largely because of product differentiation and early
obsolescence. As product differentiation becomes more common, the
supply of products that will substitute precisely for the promisor's per-
formance is reduced. For example, even during the period when there
is an abundant supply of new Datsuns for sale, two-door, two-tone
Datsuns with mag wheels, stereo, and air conditioning may be scarce in
some local markets. Moreover, early obsolescence gives the promisee a
short time in which to make a substitute purchase. If the promisor
breaches late in a model year, for example, it may be difficult for the
promisee to buy the exact model he wanted. For these reasons, a dam-
age award meant to enable a promisee to purchase "another car" could
be undercompensatory.
In addition, problems of prediction often make it difficult to put a
promisee in the position where he would have been had his promisor
performed.22 If a breach by a contractor would significantly delay or
prevent completion of a construction project and the project differs
in important respects from other projects-for example, a department
store in a different location than previous stores-courts may be re-
luctant to award "speculative" lost profits attributable to the 
breach.23
20. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(1).
21. Emotional distress caused by a breach, which does not in itself constitute a tort,
ordinarily is not recoverable in damages. See, e.g., Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App.
483, 486, 152 N.W.2d 49, 50-51 (1967) (damages for mental anguish limited to 
cases in-
volving "reckless misconduct" or contracts "inherently personal in nature").
22. The difficulties of prediction have been recognized for some time. See, e.g., RE-
STATEMENT § 329, Comment a (difficulties involved in awarding compensatory damages
"make it impracticable to attain its purpose with any near approach to exactness"); W.
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 300 (1930) (damages at best only substitute for what
plaintiff lost through loss of performance).
25. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 802-04 
(5th
Cir. 1973) (future profits of new business deemed too speculative for inclusion in dam-
ages); Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Slick's Estate, 386 S.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965) (same).
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Second, promisees have economic incentives to sue for damages when
damages are likely to be fully compensatory. A breaching promisor is
reluctant to perform and may be hostile. This makes specific per-
formance an unattractive remedy in cases in which the promisor's
performance is complex, because the promisor is more likely to render
a defective performance when that performance is coerced, and the
defectiveness of complex performances is sometimes difficult to estab-
lish in court. Further, when the promisor's performance must be
rendered over time, as in construction or requirements contracts, it is
costly for the promisee to monitor a reluctant promisor's conduct. If the
damage remedy is compensatory, the promisee would prefer it to in-
curring these monitoring costs. Finally, given the time necessary to
resolve lawsuits, promisees would commonly prefer to make substitute
transactions promptly and sue later for damages rather than hold their
affairs in suspension while awaiting equitable relief. The very fact that
a promisee requests specific performance thus implies that damages
are an inadequate remedy.24
The third reason why courts should permit promisees to elect rou-
tinely the remedy of specific performance is that promisees possess
better information than courts as to both the adequacy of damages and
the difficulties of coercing performance. Promisees know better than
courts whether the damages a court is likely to award would be ade-
quate because promisees are more familiar with the costs that breach
imposes on them. In addition, promisees generally know more about
their promisors than do courts; thus they are in a better position to
predict whether specific performance decrees would induce their
promisors to render satisfactory performances.
In sum, restrictions on the availability of specific performance can-
not be justified on the basis that damage awards are usually com-
pensatory. On the contrary, the compensation goal implies that specific
performance should be routinely available. This is because damage
awards actually are undercompensatory in more cases than is com-
monly supposed; the fact of a specific performance request is itself
good evidence that damages would be inadequate; and courts should
delegate to promisees the decision of which remedy best satisfies the
compensation goal. Further, expanding the availability of specific per-
24. Noneconomic motives could sometimes impel a promisee to seek specific perfor-
mance; the German experience, however, provides some confirmation of this point.
Although specific performance is much more widely available in Germany than in
the United States, promisees there seek the damage remedy "in a high percentage of
cases." Dawson, supra note 2, at 530; see Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, in
VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COmPARATIvE LAW 16-17 to 16-29 (1976) (claims for
damages "more common" than claims for specific performance).
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formance would not result in greater exploitation of promisors. Prom-
isees would seldom abuse the power to determine when specific per-
formance should be awarded because of the strong incentives that
promisees face to seek damages when these would be even approxi-
mately compensatory.
III. Specific Performance and Efficiency
Before examining in detail the efficiency justifications that could be
given for restricting specific performance, it will be useful to relate
these justifications to the possible bases of the compensation goal.
First, suppose that the goal rests on utilitarian or wealth maximization
grounds, 25 that is, on an assumption that compensating disappointed
promisees fully is less costly than not compensating them fully. If the
broader availability of specific performance would generate transaction
costs that exceed the costs of undercompensation the equitable remedy
would avoid, then current restrictions on specific performance would
be justified. On the other hand, if the compensation goal rests on a
moral notion that promises should be kept,20 that contract remedies
should effectuate the state of affairs-performance-that the promisor
has a duty to bring about and that the promisee has a right to have
brought about, then specific performance is a preferable remedy to
damages even though it might generate higher costs. These costs would
be the price of achieving the moral goal of contract remedies. Under
this theory, the promisee's right to an actual performance should be
overridden only if the costs of its exercise would be so excessive as to
constitute an interference with the rights of other persons.
Both possible bases of the compensation goal thus would support
the routine availability of specific performance unless specific per-
25. Professor Posner recently argued that a nonutilitarian version of consequentialism
which he calls wealth maximization underlies and justifies much current law. See Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). According to
Posner, a legal rule (indeed, all conduct) is good if it increases society's wealth, bad if
it reduces that wealth.
26. For an introduction to how a moral justification for promise-keeping can be
made, see J. MACKIE, ETHICs 110-11, 116-18, 184-85 (1977). Professor Mackie's argument,
derived from Hobbes and Hume, is that it is in a promisor's self-interest to keep his
word. A similar argument may follow from Kantian premises. Kant uses promise-keeping
as one of his four illustrations of the categorical imperative:
For the universality of a law that everyone believing himself to be in need can make
any promise he pleases with the intention not to keep it would make promising,
and the very purpose of promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he
was being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty
shams.
I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIc OF MORALS 90 (H. Paton trans. 1964).
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formance is a more costly remedy than damages. There are two princi-
pal ways in which efficiency might suffer as the result of expanding
specific performance. First, many parties might prefer to have the spe-
cific performance remedy available only in those cases in which the law
currently grants it. If the remedy's availability were greatly expanded,
these parties would negotiate contract provisions restricting its use.
Legal limitations on the availability of specific performance save these
transaction costs. Professor Anthony Kronman has argued that limiting
specific performance is justified precisely because it avoids such "pre-
breach" negotiations.2 7 Second, if specific performance were routinely
available, promisors who wanted to breach would often be compelled
to "bribe" promisees to release them from their obligations. The
negotiations required might be more complex and costly than the
post-breach negotiations that occur when breaching promisors have
merely to pay promisees their damages. Professor Richard Posner
argues, therefore, that restricting specific performance reduces "post-
breach" negotiation costs. 28 Part III considers these two arguments in
detail, as well as other efficiency aspects of the choice between specific
performance and damages.
A. Pre-Breach Negotiations
"Intention justification" theories for restricting specific performance
argue that the class of cases in which the parties now can get the
remedy, and the class of cases in which the parties would want the
remedy to be available, are coextensive. There are two difficulties with
this position. First, there is no reason to assume that the parties' pref-
erences are congruent with current law. Second, it is excessively dif-
ficult to derive from parties' preferences general legal rules respecting
when either remedy should be used.
Both weaknesses are illustrated through an analysis of the most
sophisticated intention justification theory, that of Professor Kronman.
27. Kronman, supra note 2, at 365-69.
28. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 88-89. Other commentators have made similar argu-
ments. See Clarkson, Miller, & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?
1978 Wis. L. REv. 351, 360 n.32. Professor Farnsworth recently criticized the specific
performance remedy on the apparently distinct ground that specific relief prevents a
promisor from reallocating his resources to higher valued uses even though substitutional
relief would be fully compensatory to the promisee. Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 250-51.
This criticism is incorrect because promisors can reallocate their resources-i.e., breach-
by bribing promisees not to seek specific relief. Thus Farnsworth's position reduces to the
claim that Posner makes, that the transaction costs entailed in these post-breach negotia-
tions would be higher than the transaction costs that now obtain under the damage
remedy.
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Kronman classifies as "unique" those objects for which courts would
have great difficulty identifying substitutes. Courts today generally
limit specific performance to such cases. Professor Kronman argues that
this limitation is consistent with the parties' intentions; if they were to
contract as to remedy in the absence of a general rule, they would
create a specific performance remedy only for sales of "unique" goods
or services. Kronman's argument starts from the premise that the "cost
of a specific performance provision to the promisor will be determined,
in part, by his own estimate of the likelihood that he will want to
breach the contract."29 This likelihood is primarily a function of "the
probability that he will receive a better offer for his goods or services
in the interim between formation of the contract and performance."
30
This probability is low "where the subject matter of the contract is
unique" because "there is by definition no developed market [and]
transactions are spotty at best. ...."31 In situations in which the sub-
ject matter of the contract is not unique, "by contrast, the existence of
a developed market increases the likelihood that the promisor will re-
ceive alternative offers before he has performed the contract.
' -3 2 The
promisee in the unique goods case may doubt whether the promisor will
actually perform, despite the unlikelihood that the promisor will receive
a better offer. Since damage remedies could be undercompensatory,
the promisee would probably prefer to have the specific perfor-
mance remedy available.33 When the goods are not unique, how-
ever, the promisee regards the "risk [of undercompensation] as slight
where there is a developed market generating information about suit-
able substitutes. 3 4 Thus in the unique goods case the parties would
be expected to agree to a specific performance remedy; the promisee
wants the remedy, whereas the promisor is indifferent. In the non-
unique goods case, on the other hand, the parties would probably
negotiate for a damage remedy, because damages would adequately
protect the promisee, while the promisor would want to be free to
accept more favorable offers.
Analysis of the equilibria in "developed" and "undeveloped markets"
and their reactions to exogenous shocks suggests, however, that the
promisors of unique goods care more about retaining the option of
breach than do promisors of nonunique goods. Respecting equilibria,
29. Kronman, supra note 2, at 367.




34. Id. at 369. The risk of undercompensation, however, actually may be substantial
even when "developed" markets exist. See pp. 275-76 supra.
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Professor Kronman equates an undeveloped market with a market in
which unique goods are sold. This is misleading because unique goods
markets often are well organized; the antique market provides an
example. Such markets have two distinguishing features. First, they
are usually characterized by greater price dispersion than obtains in
the market equilibria for roughly fungible goods. In addition, sellers
of unique goods face a lower "rate of arrival" of potential buyers than
do sellers of roughly fungible goods. These two phenomena are related;
a high "buyer arrival" rate implies extensive comparison shopping
among firms, whereas the degree of price dispersion a market can
sustain varies inversely with the amount of comparison shopping.3 5
Sellers of unique goods face a relatively low buyer arrival rate because
each item they sell is highly differentiated; consequently, relatively
few potential customers for such items exist. Also, search costs are
comparatively higher for unique goods; locating them can be difficult,
and the sellers often are geographically dispersed. Further, analyzing
the quality of particular unique goods and comparing different goods
usually are more time-consuming than searching for roughly fungible
goods.
A promisor/seller in an "undeveloped market"-a market in which
unique goods are sold-thus faces a lower arrival rate of potential
buyers together with the resultant higher degree of price dispersion
than a promisor in a developed market. The promisor of unique goods
consequently has grounds to believe that the offers he receives are to
some extent random, and that later offers could be much higher than
earlier ones. This promisor thus prefers damages to specific perfor-
mance because the damages remedy preserves his freedom to breach.
This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the differing
reactions of "developed" and "undeveloped" markets to exogenous
shocks.36 Exogenous shocks help to explain why promisors might re-
ceive better offers between the time they contract and the time they
are supposed to render performance. This phenomenon needs explana-
tion because a vendor of goods or services is generally assumed to sell
35. See Schwartz 9- Wilde, Intervening In Markets on the Basis of Imperfect In-
formation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 640-51 (1979).
36. Economists draw a distinction between the factors influencing market equilibria
that are intrinsic to the market ("endogenous" factors) and those that are extrinsic to it
("exogenous" factors). An example of an endogenous factor is the strategies that con-
sumers use in acquiring purchase information; market equilibria are partly a function of
the information-gathering strategies of consumers. An example of an exogenous factor is
an embargo; a particular equilibrium will be disturbed if an embargo reduces available
supply. For a discussion of the contributions of endogenous and exogenous factors to the
character of market equilibria in an information-gathering context, see Rothschild, Models
of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1283
(1973).
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to all of his purchasers on the same terms. Price discrimination is often
unlawful and its costs in mass transactions exceed the gains it pro-
duces.37 Customers generally know whether a firm offers the same
terms to all and are unlikely to make offers that exceed the going price.
In addition, firms that negotiate contracts on an individual basis have
a strong incentive not to breach, even if they receive better offers, in
order to maintain goodwill.38 In what circumstances, then, will prom-
isors receive and accept better offers?
The most frequent situation in which these circumstances arise is
when there is an unexpected and dramatic increase in demand. The
increase in demand will exert an upward pressure on prices. In the
case of nonunique goods, this pressure is partially relieved by the
ability of sellers to increase output. Unique goods, however, are in
inelastic supply; only a few Rembrandts exist, and an increase in de-
mand will not increase their number.39 In consequence, when buyers
demand more of a unique item, the primary response of sellers is to
increase the price; they can expand output only slightly, if at all.
40
37. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 35, at 638, 663-65.
38. The desire of firms to preserve goodwill is evident in the existence of two com-
mon retail practices: marking items "sold" and holding them for the original purchasers
rather than reselling them to subsequent buyers at higher prices, and, in the case of
firms that sell services, rationing temporary excess demand by queuing rather than by
selling services to subsequent customers at increased rates.
39. For a more rigorous discussion of the theory of supply elasticity, see P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICs 386-87 (10th ed. 1976).
40. The argument in text can be clarified by a diagram.
PRICE PRICE
S
I ' -D' DI
D DQUANTITY QUANTITY
Q Q' a 0'
FIGURE I FIGURE II
In both figures, an increase in demand is represented by a similar shift in the demand
curve from D to D'. In Figure I, however, supply (S) is inelastic; no matter how great
the shift in demand, little more of the good is supplied. Thus almost the full force of
the demand shift is translated into the price increase. In Figure 2, supply is elastic, so
that output expands considerably and the price increase is more moderate.
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Therefore, when demand unexpectedly increases, a promisor in a
unique goods market could command higher prices than a promisor in
a nonunique goods market. The seller of unique goods, when the con-
tract is negotiated, thus has a strong incentive to preserve his freedom
to breach. A seller of nonunique goods, by contrast, will probably have
to compete with many other vendors for any new business that a
demand increase generates, and the resultant price rise will be rela-
tively modest. Thus he will care less about preserving his freedom to
breach in response to demand shifts.41 In sum, if the promisor's prefer-
ence for specific performance or damages is assumed to be determined
solely by whether the performance at issue is unique, the promisor
would not choose specific performance in situations in which the law
now routinely grants it.42
In addition, considerations exist that could lead promisees not to
prefer a right to specific performance in cases in which it is currently
available and to seek this right in situations in which it is not now
granted.43 Purchasers of houses or land, for example, may sometimes
41. This analysis applies not only to goods that have traditionally been considered
unique but also to goods that are currently in inelastic supply. Prices also will rise if
demand remains constant and supply contracts. Provided the demand curve remains
constant, the suppliers of unique and nonunique goods will be similarly affected, and
thus have similar incentives to preserve their freedom to breach.
42. Confirming the textual analysis that shifts in demand affect preferences for spe-
cific performance, a number of recent suits for specific performance seem to have been
caused in part by shifts in demand, e.g., Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1249 (5th
Cir. 1977) (cotton); Tower City Grain Co. v. Richman, 232 N.W.2d 61, 63 (N.D. 1975)
(boxcar shortage suggests increased demand for grain); or combinations of shifts in de-
mand and supply, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 36 (8th Cir. 1975)
(propane gas); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (S.D.
Fla. 1975) (jet fuel).
43. The cheapest cost-avoider technique, see G. CALABRER, THE CosT oF AcCIDENTS
135-40 (1970), provides an alternative means of analyzing the parties' intentions respect-
ing remedy provisions in unique goods transactions. The relevant risk is that the prom-
isor/seller will get a better offer in the interval between contract formation and perfor-
mance time. If the seller bears this risk, he must perform despite the better offer; if
the buyer bears the risk, the seller is free to take the better offer and pay damages to
the first buyer. The seller, this analysis assumes, is the cheapest cost-avoider of the risk
of receiving a better offer because he generally has superior knowledge of market condi-
tions. Since the parties will typically negotiate to put the risk on the cheapest cost-
avoider, they would normally contract for a specific performance remedy in the unique
goods case. Professor Kronman does not make this argument, and he may be right not
to do so because generalizations about whether promisors or promisees have superior
ability to predict the future are too difficult to make. For example, an individual selling
an heirloom to a dealer would probably have less knowledge than the dealer; a dealer
selling to a consumer would probably have more knowledge than the consumer; and a
wholesale antique dealer selling to a retail dealer would probably have no more knowl-
edge than this buyer. Thus it is incorrect to argue that parties commonly would nego-
tiate for a specific performance remedy in the unique goods case; such an argument must
rest on the unproven assertion that promisors have a comparative advantage at predicting
the future.
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prefer liquidated damage clauses to specific performance because sellers
in possession during the specific performance action might cause dam-
age that would be difficult to prove in court. Also, a purchaser of a
unique good may prefer damages to specific performance if he believes
that he could later persuade a court to accept his exaggerated claim as
to the cost of an adequate substitute. Promisees of nonunique goods,
on the other hand, may prefer specific performance because large dam-
age judgments can be difficult to obtain or satisfy.
44
Thus no single factor-such as the uniqueness of the performance-
will determine the parties' preferences as to remedy in all cases, for the
parties' preferences are context-dependent. Further analysis would
probably suggest additional discrepancies between the remedies the
parties desire in specific situations and those the law now provides. The
costs of tailoring the law to the parties' preferences on a case-by-case
basis, however, would exceed the gains. As with an attempt to draft
substantive contract clauses, a great number of rules would have to be
devised. Therefore, because it has not been established that restricting
specific performance minimizes transaction costs of negotiating reme-
dies, and tailoring remedies to the parties' preferences would be so
costly administratively, intention justification theories should be aban-
doned as guides to remedy availability. Rather, specific performance
should be made generally available on the ground that the compensa-
tion goal is not met adequately by making damages the sole available
remedy in many cases. This recommendation presupposes, however,
that the post-breach negotiation costs thereby generated would not
exceed those generated under current law. This presupposition must
be analyzed next.
B. Post-Breach Negotiations
The second efficiency argument for restricting the availability of
specific performance is that making specific performance freely avail-
44. For example, some cotton purchasers unsuccessfully sought specific performance
of contracts that their grower-sellers had breached when cotton prices tripled between
the time the contract was negotiated and the time for performance. The buyers may
have believed that local juries might be reluctant to award large damages against local
farmer defendants. See Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1977); Duval & Co.
v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975).
The Restatement lists "the degree of probability that damages awarded cannot in
fact be collected" as a factor to be considered in "determining the adequacy of the rem-
edy in damages." RESTATEMENT § 361(d); accord, RSTATEMENT (SECOND) § 374(c). See
Severson v. Elberon Elevator, Inc., 250 NAV.2d 417, 423 (Iowa 1977) (defendant's financial
straits relevant to specific performance request). The unlikelihood of collecting a damage
award would of course justify specific performance regardless of whether the goods
were "unique."
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able would generate higher post-breach negotiation costs than the
damage remedy now generates. For example, suppose that a buyer (B 1)
contracts with a seller (S) to buy a widget for $100. Prior to delivery,
demand unexpectedly increases. The widget market is temporarily in
disequilibrium as buyers make offers at different prices. While the
market is in disequilibrium, a second buyer (B2) makes a contract
with S to purchase the same widget for $130. Subsequently, the new
equilibrium price for widgets is $115. If specific performance is avail-
able in this case, B 1 is likely to demand it, in order to compel S to
pay him some of the profit that S will make from breaching. B1 could,
for example, insist on specific performance unless S pays him $20 ($15
in substitution damages plus a $5 premium). 45 If S agrees, BI can cover
at $115,4 6 and be better off by $5 than he would have been under the
damage remedy, which would have given him only the difference be-
tween the cover price and the contract price ($15). Whenever S's better
offer is higher than the new market price, the seller has an incentive
to breach, and the first buyer has an incentive to threaten specific per-
formance in order to capture some of the seller's gains from breach.
The post-breach negotiations between S and Bl represent a "dead-
weight" efficiency loss; the negotiations serve only to redistribute
wealth between S and Bl, without generating additional social wealth.
If society is indifferent as to whether sellers or buyers as a group profit
from an increase in demand, the law should seek to eliminate this
efficiency loss. Limiting buyers to the damage remedy apparently does
so by foreclosing post-breach negotiations.
This analysis is incomplete, however. Negotiation costs are also
generated when B1 attempts to collect damages. If the negotiations by
which first buyers (B1 here) capture a portion of their sellers' profits
from breach are less costly than the negotiations (or lawsuits) by which
first buyers recover the market contract differential, then specific
performance would generate lower post-breach negotiation costs than
damages. This seems unlikely, however. The difference between the
contract and market prices is often easily determined, and breaching
sellers have an incentive to pay it promptly so as not to have their extra
profit consumed by lawyers' fees. By contrast, if buyers can threaten
45. BI would not require S to convey the widget to him for resale to B2 at $130
because if S breached his contract with B2, B2 would then buy a widget in the open
market for $115. Only S can sell to B2 at $130, because B2 has contracted only with S
to purchase at that price.
46. To "cover" is to make a substitute purchase. See U.C.C. § 2-712(l). "Cover costs"
refer not to the price paid for the substitute, but rather to the costs incurred in locating
the substitute and making a second transaction.
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specific performance and thereby seek to capture some of the sellers'
profits from breach, sellers will bargain hard to keep as much of the
profits as they can. Therefore, the damage remedy would probably
result in quick payments by breaching sellers while the specific per-
formance remedy would probably give rise to difficult negotiations.
47
Thus the post-breach negotiation costs associated with the specific
performance remedy would seem to be greater than those associated
with the damage remedy.
48
This analysis makes the crucial assumption, however, that the first
buyer, BI, has access to the market at a significantly lower cost than
the seller; 49 though both pay the same market price for the substitute,
BI is assumed to have much lower cover costs. If this assumption is
false, specific performance would not give rise to post-breach negotia-
tions. Consider the illustration again. Suppose that BI can obtain
specific performance, but that S can cover as conveniently as Bl °. If
47. Similarly, a liquidated damage clause with a very high payoff would also produce
negotiations. This is because, if the clause is enforceable, the payoff would exceed any
profit the promisor could realize from breach, but the promisee has an incentive to
permit breach in return for a share of this profit. A commentator discussing the en-
forceability of these clauses has asserted that the transaction costs of negotiating over
the profit would seem to be less than "the litigation or settlement costs of breach of
contract" if the clauses were not enforceable. Note, Liquidated Damages and Penalties
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of
Contract Damages, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 1055, 1079 (1978). This fails to take into account
the promisee's incentive to settle quickly when the legal damages are easily ascertainable
and less than the profit. Other recent commentary suggests that the negotiation costs
that might result from a liquidated damage clause with a high payoff "may not be merely
nominal" because "there are no legal guidelines to provide a certain answer as to what"
the seller must pay his initial buyer. Clarkson, Miller, & Muris, supra note 28, at 362
n.34; cf. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 681, 743-44 (1973) (negotiation costs are reduced when
damage rules establish clear guidelines for bargaining).
48. The sales-law rule that prohibits sellers from obtaining specific performance, i.e.,
payment, for unaccepted goods can be explained in these terms. Under the current rule,
the seller must resell the goods; otherwise, the rejecting buyer would have to resell them.
Sellers are probably more efficient resellers than the rejecting buyers because selling is
sometimes a specialized activity. Thus, if buyers were liable for the price, they would
probably bribe sellers to resell the goods for them. Negotiation costs avoided under the
current rule would thereby be generated. At present, the sellers resell the goods and
proceed against the buyers to recover the market contract differential. If the resultant
transaction costs are lower than those that would result from the buyers' attempts to
bribe sellers to resell the goods, then the current rule is more efficient than granting
sellers a price action. Because the market contract differential is easily determined while
the appropriate bribe is not, it seems likely that the current rule is the more efficient one.
49. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 89.
50. When the contract between S and BI involves the sale of goods, S of course covers
by purchasing similar goods in the market. When the contract involves services, S cov-
ers by providing a delegate to render the promised performance. Buyers are required
to accept the delegate unless the promisor's performance is in some sense unique. Compare
Corson v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 449, 109 N.W. 735, 736 (1906) (attorney's service to his client
held nondelegable) with New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert Elevated R.R. Co., 91 N.Y.
153, 167-68 (1883) (construction contract duties delegable). See generally J. CALtM.AR &
J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 430-33 (1970).
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B1 insists on a conveyance, S would buy another widget in the market
for $115 and deliver on his contracts with both BI and B2. A total of
three transactions would result: S-B1; S-B2; S2-S (S's purchase of a
second widget). None of these transactions involves post-breach negotia-
tions. Thus if sellers can cover conveniently, the specific performance
remedy does not generate post-breach negotiation costs.
The issue, then, is whether sellers and buyers generally have similar
cover costs. Analysis suggests that they do. Sellers as well as buyers have
incentives to learn market conditions. Because sellers have to "check
the competition," they will have a good knowledge of market prices
and quality ranges. Also, when a buyer needs goods or services tailored
to his own needs, he will be able to find such goods or services more
cheaply than sellers in general could, for they would first have to
ascertain the buyer's needs before going into the market, However, in
situations in which the seller and the first buyer have already negotiated
a contract, the seller is likely to have as much information about the
buyer's needs as the buyer has. Moreover, in some markets, such as those
for complex machines and services, sellers are likely to have a com-
parative advantage over buyers in evaluating the probable quality of
performance and thus would have lower cover costs. Therefore, no
basis exists for assuming that buyers generally have significantly lower
cover costs than sellers. It follows that expanding the availability of
specific performance would not generate higher post-breach negotia-
tion costs than the damage remedy.
Four serious objections may be made to this conclusion: (i) dif-
ferential cover costs sometimes help induce breach, and their existence
leads to higher post-breach negotiation costs under specific performance
than under damages; (ii) in some cases, sellers cannot cover at all; (iii)
when the first and second buyers have different uses for the subject of
the sale, specific performance generates higher post-breach negotiation
costs than damages; (iv) when changed circumstances occur-an im-
portant cause of breach-transaction costs are higher under specific
performance than under damages.
The first objection assumes that sellers breach partly because their
cover costs are higher than those of their buyers; it then argues that
when cover costs do diverge, allowing specific performance seemingly
is less efficient than having damages be the sole remedy. Returning to
the widget hypothetical, let Cb = the first buyer's (Bl's) cover costs;
Cs = the seller's cover costs. Assume that S has higher cover costs than
Bl, i.e., Cs > Cb. If specific performance were available, BI could
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threaten to obtain it, so as to force S to pay him part of the cover cost
differential, Cs - Cb. If BI made a credible threat, S would be better
off negotiating than covering. Because only the availability of specific
performance enables BI to force this negotiation, one could argue that
it is less efficient than having damages as the sole remedy.
This objection is incorrect, even if differential cover costs influence
seller decisions to breach. A credible threat by B1 to seek specific
performance would usually require preparing or initiating a lawsuit.
This would entail costs of lost business time, lost goodwill and lawyer's
fees, and these costs usually exceed any cover cost differential (Cs - Cb)
that may exist. This is because the magnitude of cover costs-and hence
of the differential-are low in relation to legal costs. Locating and
arranging for substitute transactions are routine, relatively inexpensive
business activities. Since the legal and related costs necessary for a
credible threat commonly exceed the cover cost differential, it would
rarely pay buyers to threaten specific performance to capture part of
this differential. Thus no post-breach negotiations would be engen-
dered by any differences in the parties' cover costs.
The second objection to the conclusion that post-breach negotiation
costs are no higher under specific performance than under damages
follows from the fact that in some cases sellers cannot cover at all. In
these cases, buyers can always compel post-breach negotiations by
threatening specific performance. There are two situations in which
a seller cannot cover: if he is a monopolist or if the goods are unique.
In either event, the first buyer would also be unable to cover. If neither
the seller nor the first buyer can cover, no reason exists to believe that
there would be higher post-breach negotiation costs with specific per-
formance than with damages. If specific performance were available,
BI and S would negotiate over Bl's share of the profit that S's deal
with B2 would generate, or B1 would insist on a conveyance from S
and then sell to B2. If only the damages remedy is available, BI would
negotiate with S respecting his expected net gain from performance
rather than over the contract market difference, because he could not
purchase a substitute. This expected gain is often difficult to calculate,
and easy for the buyer to exaggerate. There is no reason to believe that
negotiations or litigation over this gain would be less costly than the
negotiations over division of the profit that B2's offer creates, or the
costs of a second conveyance between BI and B2. Thus even when the
seller cannot cover, specific performance has not been shown to gen-
erate higher post-breach negotiation costs than damages. Moreover,
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when neither party can cover-the case under discussion-buyers have
a right to specific performance under current law.51
To summarize, if the initial buyer has access to the market at a
significantly lower cost than the seller, a damages rule generates lower
post-breach negotiation costs than a rule that makes specific per-
formance routinely available. It seems likely, however, that both
parties will be able to cover at similar, relatively low cost, or that
neither will be able to cover at all. In either event, post-breach negotia-
tion costs are similar under the two rules.52
The third objection to this conclusion concerns cases in which the
first and second buyers have different uses for the good for sale. If the
good is in inelastic supply in one of those uses, allowing specific per-
formance would be less efficient than only allowing a damages remedy.
For example, suppose that B1 contracts to purchase property for use as
a farm. B2 discovers that the land is an ideal location for a restaurant
and persuades the seller to convey it to him at a much higher price than
BI agreed to pay. Both BI and S could probably cover respecting the
first contract, for farmland is often fungible. Thus if a damage rule
obtained, S would offer to convey a different parcel to B1 or pay B1
damages, and sell his own land, which is unique to B2's use, to B2. If
BI could get specific performance, however, two undesirable outcomes
might occur. First, BI may discover B2's purpose and insist on a
conveyance to adopt B2's intended use. Thus BI could freeload on the
51. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (authorizing specific performance "where the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances.") Comment 2 to the provision provides
that "inability to cover is strong evidence of 'other proper circumstances.'" See Kaiser
Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 932-33 (N.D. Cal.
1970), aPteal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1971); P. 275 supra.
When the seller is a monopolist, there would seem to be one case in which specific
performance should be denied. Suppose that a monopolist contracts to sell widgets before
his factory is destroyed by fire. If specific performance would lie, the buyer might at-
tempt to extort the seller by threatening to obtain a specific performance order, for
the seller could neither cover nor perform. Negotiations would result as to the sum the
seller would pay to 'avoid being found in contempt. These negotiations would constitute
a deadweight efficiency loss. See R. PosNaR, supra note 2, at 96-97. This outcome would
not occur, however. When goods are to be delivered from a specified source and the
source is destroyed by unanticipated casualty, the seller is excused from performing. See
U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 5.
52. This analysis seems to overlook the buyer's duty to mitigate damages. Suppose
that S has significantly higher performance costs than the market as a whole, so that
BI could purchase a substitute for less than it would cost S to perform. Should S be
able to assert his unusually high costs as a defense to an action for specific performance
on the ground that BI can mitigate S's damages by making a substitute purchase? The
answer should be no for two reasons. First, this situation will rarely occur because S
can often cover as easily as BI, see p. 287 supra. Therefore the defense is largely unneces-
sary. Second, enabling S to oppose an action for specific performance on the ground that
his costs are relatively high would create a defense that would be costly to adjudicate, and
could be unpredictable in application.
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information developed by B2, which would reduce the incentive of
persons like B2 to discover new uses. Alternatively, B1 might either
negotiate with S to capture some of S's profit from breach, or
insist on conveyance and resell the property to B2. Both alternatives
could create transaction costs without generating new social wealth. On
the other hand, if BI could only recover from S the difference between
the price of a similar piece of farmland and the contract price, transac-
tion costs would be lower, because S has strong incentives to cover or
remit this sum voluntarily. 53 Therefore, the damage remedy is more
efficient than the specific performance remedy where the market pro-
vides substitutes for Bl's intended use of the property, but not for
B2's intended use. Courts nevertheless currently allow specific per-
formance in such cases.54 Thus the issue is whether, if specific per-
formance were made routinely available, an exception should be
created for the different-use case. The answer is no, because the litiga-
tion and uncertainty costs that the exception would generate would
probably exceed the excess bargaining costs of making specific per-
formance available in this relatively uncommon situation.
The final objection to the conclusion that post-breach negotiation
costs are no higher under specific performance than under damages
applies in the context of unexpectedly rapid inflation. Suppose that
a promisee would realize $3,000 profit from a construction project that
he contracted to buy for $10,000. Suppose also that, at the time he
made the contract, the promisor anticipated that the project would
cost him $8,000, and that unanticipated inflation raised the promisor's
costs to $15,000. In the event that the promisee's anticipated profits
from completion of the project do not similarly increase, the promisee's
best strategy would be to threaten specific performance so as to force
the promisor to share part of the $7,000 cost savings that the promisor
53. See p. 285 supra.
54. The overwhelmingly popular rule is that "[s]pecific performance of a contract for
the sale of land is generally granted even though the injury resulting from nonperfor-
mance is compensable in damages." Atchison v. City of Englewood, 568 P.2d 13, 22 (Colo.
1977). In a very few cases, courts have refused to grant specific performance of land
contracts on the ground that money damages would adequately protect the promisee.
See, e.g., Watkins v. Paul, 95 Idaho 499, 511 P.2d 781 (1973). When the vendor has sold to
a subsequent good faith purchaser at a price considerably above the contract price, how-
ever, courts have occasionally refused to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of the
sale, and only awarded damages. See Grummel v. Hollenstein, 90 Ariz. 356, 367 P.2d 960
(1962) (refusing to reopen judgment to take evidence as to proceeds of sale to third party);
Cushing v. Levi, 117 Cal. App. 94, 3 P.2d 958 (1931) (awarding as damages less than one-
third of profit from sale to third party). A much higher price suggests that the second
buyer had a higher valued use, and the failure of some courts to impose a constructive
trust shows an unwillingness to prevent sellers from conveying to subsequent buyers who
have more valuable uses.
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would realize from breaching. Although the promisee loses $3,000 from
breach, the promisor saves $7,000. The negotiations over division of
the net $4,000 savings that breach makes possible are a deadweight ef-
ficiency loss. If only the damage remedy were available to the promisee,
however, the promisee could still force such negotiations because he
would retain the power to impose a $7,000 loss on the promisor.
The standard damage measure for breach of a construction contract
is the difference between the contract price and the new market price.55
In the hypothetical, the new market price would be $17,000 ($15,000
cost plus the contractor's $2,000 profit), and the contract price is
$10,000. Thus specific performance and the damages remedy create
identical incentives for the parties to engage in costly post-breach
negotiations in the event of unexpected inflation.56
C. Efficiency Gains from the Routine Availability of
Specific Performance
The analysis thus far suggests that making specific performance
widely available at the election of the promisee would not result in
more costly pre- or post-breach negotiations than the damage remedy
does at present. Further expanding the availability of specific per-
formance would produce certain efficiency gains: it would minimize
the inefficiencies of undercompensation, reduce the need for liquidated
damage clauses, minimize strategic behavior, and save the costs of
litigating complex damage issues.
First, if only a damage remedy is available, promisors may sometimes
breach when their gains from breach exceed the damages a court will
assess, though not the full costs breach imposes on the promisees. Such
breaches may be inefficient for they make promisors better off but
promisees worse off.
Second, under current law, parties have an incentive to create a
"contractual" specific performance remedy in cases in which specific
55. See R.srATEMENT § 346.
56. The widget hypothetical used in text illustrates that expanding the availability
of specific performance could sometimes result in overcompensation. Suppose that S
actually conveyed the widget to B2, a good faith purchaser for value. BI could not
recover the widget from B2, nor could BI get specific performance. In many jurisdic-
tions he could, however, impose a constructive trust on the sales proceeds; thus he would
recover $30 rather than the contract market differential of $15. The constructive trust
remedy that a right to specific performance enables the promisee to invoke thus can
overcompensate. The deterrent effect of the constructive trust, however, often is the
only effective way of ensuring that a promisor will not defeat the promisee's right to
specific performance by promptly conveying to a third party. The occasional overcom-
pensation that results seems a reasonable price to pay in order to maintain the effective-
ness of the specific performance remedy.
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performance is now prohibited or its availability is uncertain by
negotiating liquidated damage clauses. 57 This is because these clauses
perform the same function as specific performance-ensuring adequate
compensation or performance when damage rules provide neither. If
specific performance were routinely available, much of the costs to the
parties of negotiating liquidated damage clauses would be saved.58
Third, commentators have argued that liquidated damage clauses
that require relatively high payouts would create incentives for the
promisee to breach when changed circumstances cause the promisee to
prefer the payout to performance. 59 Resources spent on inducing
breach or on countering this conduct constitute deadweight efficiency
losses. If specific performance were made widely available, however,
contracting parties would have an incentive to choose it rather than
liquidated damage clauses because, as we have seen, specific perform-
ance and liquidated damages often are substitutes. Since the gains to the
promisee from inducing breach are greatly minimized when large
damage payouts do not accompany it, such strategic behavior would
rarely occur.
Finally, specific performance often is sought when damages would
be difficult to establish. Granting the remedy in such cases would save
the resources that would otherwise be devoted to exploring complex
damage questions.60
D. Administrative Cost Objections to Specific Performance
The previous discussion has shown that certain efficiency gains can
be expected as the result of expanding the availability of specific per-
formance. One final efficiency objection remains-that the remedy
increases the administrative costs of the parties and the courts because
57. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 559.
58. There would be new costs associated with parties' "contracting out" of a general
specific performance rule, which would in part offset these savings. As pp. 281-84 sutkra
showed, however, the general preferences of the parties respecting specific performance
or damages seem impossible to ascertain; thus any demonstrated savings from expanding
the availability of specific performance should be considered a net gain.
59. See Clarkson, Miller, & Muris, supra note 28, at 368-72. Liquidated damage
clauses are not likely to inspire many attempts to induce breach, however, for if the
penalty is high, the promisee would have to go to great lengths to get the promisor not
to perform. Because any attempt to induce breach violates the promisee's duty to act in
good faith and because the requisite extraordinary efforts should be relatively easy to
prove, the promisee would probably be precluded from enforcing the liquidated damage
clause if he engaged in such "strategic behavior." While Clarkson, Miller, and Muris
recognize the relevance of the promisee's duty of good faith to their argument, they
underestimate its force. Id. at 371. For another criticism of their argument see A. KRON-
MAN 8- R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT 224-25 (1979).
60. See D. DOBBS, REMEnsas 885 (1973).
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of the expense entailed in creating and implementing specific per-
formance decrees. This objection is at present the basis for a defense
to a specific performance action: a court can deny the remedy on the
ground of "difficulty of supervision""' even if a plaintiff otherwise
establishes a right to specific performance. An analysis of the administra-
tive cost objection, however, establishes that the difficulty of super-
vision defense should be available much less frequently than current
law permits. Two arguments support this view. First, as demonstrated
below, it is often difficult to know whether the costs to courts of allow-
ing a specific performance remedy would exceed the gains resulting
from increased availability of the remedy. In situations in which a cost
comparison between specific performance and damages is not possible,
the more accurate remedy, specific performance, should be granted.
Second, the administrative costs that the specific performance remedy
imposes on the parties should not count against its wider use, because
those costs will be incurred only when the parties perceive them to be
lower than the gains from equitable relief.
Courts, in enforcing the supervision defense, are concerned with
their inability to supervise performance 2 and with the burden of
further litigation. 63 Yet, as the cases of the civil rights and antitrust
injunctions demonstrate, courts have effectively supervised contentious
parties in complex matters over long periods. 64 Courts that refuse to
award specific performance on the basis of supervision difficulties seem
implicitly to assume, however, that the costs of granting equitable
relief exceed any benefits from doing so.
Granting specific performance does impose costs on courts. Judges
may have to devote greater time and resources to tailoring and
supervising a specific performance decree than would have to be
devoted to devising and enforcing a damage judgment. Thus equitable
relief can be given at the expense of judicial attention to other mat-
ters.05 Courts, however, can eliminate much of this opportunity cost by
61. See note 11 suPra (citing cases in which the difficulty of supervision defense was
allowed).
62. See, e.g., Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App.
2d 300, 304, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150 (1967) (specific performance denied for contract
requiring continuing supervision); Egbert v. Way, 15 Wash. App. 76, 80, 546 P.2d 1246,
1248-49 (1976) (specific performance might properly be denied if judicial supervision were
unreasonably difficult).
63. See, e.g., Yonan v. Oak Park Fed. Say. &- Loan Ass'n, 27 Ill. App. 3d 967, 974,
326 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1975) (specific performance denied for construction contract where
there was risk of further litigation).
64. Extensive illustrations are given in 0. Fiss, INjucrioNs 325-481 (1972). See also 0.
Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 36-37 (1978).
65. This conclusion seems plausible intuitively, but may be incorrect because it as-
sumes that the supply of judicial services is inelastic. In a recent statistical study, Professor
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appointing special masters. 66 This practice would also shift any addi-
tional resource costs of specific performance primarily to the parties.
Masters can be used to fashion decrees, as well as to supervise per-
formance and hear appeals respecting compliance.
As the previous section has shown, increasing the availability of
specific performance actually creates substantial efficiency gains. On
the basis of information currently available, it is impossible to say
whether those gains would exceed the increase in administrative and
judicial opportunity costs that the availability of specific performance
would engender. This is particularly so if courts delegated supervisory
and other administrative tasks to masters. Because the normative goal
of contract remedies is compensation, specific performance should lie
unless it can be shown that the costs of specific performance would
exceed the gains. As such a case has not been made, the administrative
cost objection should seldom support denial of specific performance .
7
The possibility that the parties will incur greater costs as a result of
the specific performance remedy if supervision of a decree is required
should not count against the wider availability of the remedy. These
costs will be incurred only when the benefits of specific performance
Gillespie cast doubt on the validity of this assumption. See Gillespie, The Production of
Court Services, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1976). He found that federal district courts disposed
of more cases when they conducted a higher proportion of trials. He suggested two ex-
planations for these results. First, when courts use trials as a matter of course, the parties
have greater incentives to settle. Second, the evidence suggests that the supply of
judicial services is fairly elastic; as he put it, "judges work harder, longer or more ef-
ficiently when there is a need to do so." Id. at 264.
This argument, as applied to specific performance questions, suggests that if courts
issued a higher proportion of decrees that required supervision, they might not be forced
to neglect other tasks, because the prospect of these decrees might induce more parties to
settle or perform and because judges might expand output. Thus the opportunity cost
of increased supervision might in fact be slight.
66. Masters have been used to help enforce specific performance decrees since
Elizabethan times. See I G. SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 647 (1846). Judge Hough was
an influential advocate of the use of masters in this country. See Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle
Co. v. Hartford-Fairmont Co., 1 F.2d 318, 319-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (urging use of "com-
petent receivers" to aid judges in supervising difficult business problems). Rule 53(b),
however, states that use of a master "shall be the exception and not the rule." FED. R.
Civ. P. 53(b). Commentators have argued that use of a master is an abdication of judicial
functions, and that it increases the cost of litigation. See Note, Masters and Magistrates
in the Federal Courts, 88 HARv. L. REv. 779, 790-91, 791 n.82 (1975); Kaufman, Masters in
the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUri. L. Rav. 452, 452-53 (1958). Neither objection is
forceful in this context, however. Since a master's role would primarily be to supervise
court decrees, courts would perform the major aspect of the judicial function. Further-
more, the costs of supervision do not vanish if a court performs them; they are simply
externalized to the public fisc. The parties would more appropriately bear these costs
because they are best able to minimize them. See pp. 295-96 infra.
67. See pp. 304-05 infra (discussing narrow circumstances in which difficulty of super-
vision defense should be permitted).
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exceed its incremental costs.68 The question remains, however, which
party should absorb supervision costs if a court appoints a master. If
both parties can calculate the expected value of these costs when they
contract, this question is trivial. Suppose a rule is adopted that prom-
isees must pay the costs of a master and other court costs associated with






construction services, for example, and let S be the supply curve. At
equilibrium, quantity Q of services are supplied at price P. If the
rule were changed, and promisors were required to absorb the ad-
ditional costs of specific performance, the supply curve would shift to
S' because it would then be more expensive to supply construction
services. The magnitude of the shift would reflect the expected value
of these costs. The demand curve, however, would shift by roughly the
same amount as the supply curve because construction services become
more desirable to promisees: if a promisor breaches, a master's services
are provided "free."' 9 Whereas the market price for construction ser-
vices will rise to P' when promisors bear the extra costs of specific
performance, the quantity of services traded remains at Q. Therefore,
no efficiency consequences result from allocating these costs to one
party or the other.
This analysis assumes, however, that no information asymmetries
exist. In fact, promisors may know more about the likelihood of their
68. This argument assumes certain knowledge on the part of the parties concerning
the benefits and costs of equitable relief. See pp. 276-77 supra.
69. Because the costs of a master's services would be included in the contract price,
the marginal cost to a promisee of using these services in the event of breach falls to zero.
This could create a "moral hazard" problem because more masters' services will be con-
sumed than if promisees had to pay for these services as they were required. The other
costs of litigation that promisees would have to bear, however, seem high enough to make
this problem unimportant.
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own breach than do promisees. If promisees were to bear the costs of
masters, they might over- or underestimate them. Either mistake re-
duces allocative efficiency. In the former case, too few services are
purchased; in the latter case, too many. At the same time, promisees
know better than promisors whether and to what extent damages
might be undercompensatory. Thus if promisors are made to bear the
additional costs of specific performance, they may over- or under-
estimate these costs. Again, allocative inefficiency is likely to result.
It is difficult to predict the direction in which these information
asymmetries are most pronounced.
However, in the most important practical context, that of construc-
tion contracts, it is possible to predict the direction in which the
asymmetries would be most pronounced. Construction promisors seem
better able to predict the likelihood that damages will be unsatisfactory
to promisees than promisees are able to predict the likelihood of breach.
A promisee would have difficulty in predicting breach because there
are probably numerous contractor promisors, and construction firms
differ widely in competence and reliability. Thus the promisee would
have to obtain data about numerous firms; the promisee could not
instead rely on common knowledge about the reliability of the service.
In addition, consumer promisees would have even greater difficulty
in predicting breach. Consumers use major construction services in-
frequently, and thus lack the incentive to explore market conditions
in detail as well as the opportunity to obtain expertise in evaluating
market data. On the other hand, construction firms in all markets
often can assess the relative "uniqueness" of their own performances.
Therefore, greater misallocations would probably result if promisees
rather than promisors bore the costs of supervision. Thus breaching
promisors should bear these costs in construction contexts.
70
IV. Specific Performance and Liberty
The analysis thus far indicates that none of the efficiency arguments
against expansion of the availability of specific performance are per-
suasive, except in the rare cases in which the difficulty of supervision
defense properly applies. There is, however, another basis for objection
to specific performance. A moral objection to expansion of the avail-
ability of this remedy can be raised on the ground that requiring per-
70. To allow for exceptional individual circumstances, parties should be permitted to
contract out of this rule.
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formance interferes with the promisor's liberty more than requiring
the payment of money. If this liberty interest takes precedence over the
goals that specific performance serves, the equitable remedy should be
prohibited or restricted.71 The liberty interest objection consequently
cannot be evaluated fully without a theory that would either reconcile
or enable choice to be made among four arguably relevant goals of
contract law: (i) to permit a promisor freely to choose the terms under
which to contract, including an implied term providing for specific
performance; (ii) to prevent a promisor from the possibly undue com-
pulsion of having to perform; (iii) to minimize the costs of under-
compensation; (iv) to give the promisee the performance he bought
because he is morally entitled to it. Developing such a metatheory is
beyond the scope of this Article, but fortunately it is not necessary to
deal with most of the liberty interest arguments.
To begin, a promisor's liberty interest is not seriously compromised
by a specific performance decree if the promisor sells roughly fungible
goods or is in the business of selling unique goods. In either circum-
stance, the goods are assets to the promisor much like cash; requiring
their delivery is not relevantly different from requiring the delivery of
cash. Similarly, requiring a sizable corporation that renders services to
perform for a given promisee does not violate the corporation's as-
sociational interests or the associational interests of its employees.
Liberty interests are affected, however, in the case of an individual
promisor who performs personal services. In part for this reason, cur-
rent law does not allow specific performance to be granted in this
case. 72 Liberty interests might also be implicated if a promisor were
required to deliver goods or realty to which he has a sentimental at-
tachment, on the ground that his liberty comprehends the right to
define himself partly in terms of the possession of tangible things. 73
The law, however, commonly awards specific performance in such
cases; goods which have sentimental associations for the promisor may
71. The distinction in French law between "obligations to do and not to do" and
"obligations to convey" reflects this concern. Breach of the former is compensable only in
damages, whereas breach of the latter may be remedied by an order equivalent to specific
performance. Different remedies apply because "[i]t was considered less onerous to owe
money than to be liable to compulsion actually to perform an act or forebearance."
Treitel, supra note 24, at 13.
72. See Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852) (personal services contract enforced
by enjoining performance elsewhere rather than by requiring specific performance); RE-
STATEMENT § 379 (same).
73. This "personality theory of property" is usually traced to Hegel. See G. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 41-71 (T. Knox trans. 1972); S. AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE
MODERN STATE 88-89, 135-37 (1972).
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not have close substitutes for the promisee,74 while all realty is pre-
sumed unique.
75
The liberty interest objection thus poses no barrier to expanding
the availability of specific performance to sales of roughly fungible
goods and corporate services. But it does suggest eliminating use of the
remedy in some cases in which it now is available. This suggestion is
premature, however. To limit specific performance with regard, say,
to unique goods would first require the development of a coherent
theory of the "personality aspect" of property ownership. It must then
be shown that protection of the liberty interest to which the theory
gives rise is more important than the goals that specific performance
is thought to serve. Until this showing is made, liberty motivated ex-
ceptions to a rule of specific performance on promisee request should
not be created.
V. Defenses to Specific Performance
Under current law, a promisee cannot obtain specific performance
simply by showing breach and the absence of an adequate remedy at
law; special defenses that apply only to requests for specific performance
further limit the availability of the remedy. These defenses include
inadequacy of consideration, lack of security for the promisee's per-
formance, unilateral mistake by the promisor, and difficulty of super-
vising performance.76 They can be divided into two categories, those
stemming from perceived unfairness of the contract and those stem-
ming from perceived difficulties in implementing the remedy.
A. Unfair Contracts
When a promisee cannot prove damages, denial of an equitable
remedy constitutes a decision not to enforce the contract.77 Because
74. For example, "[h]eirlooms, family treasures . . . . a grandfather's clock . . . a
baby's worn-out shoe, or faithful old Dobbin the faithful horse .... " RESTATEMENT § 361
Comment e, are goods with "sentimental associations" that may justify a grant of specific
performance. Ad. § 361(b). Such items may have sentimental associations for promisors as
well as promisees.
75. For a striking example of a grant of specific performance in spite of the promisor's
sentimental attachment to the property, see Hutchins v. Honeycutt, 286 N.C. 314, 210
S.E.2d 254 (1974) (conveyance of "The old Home Place").
76. See p. 273 and notes 8-11 supra.
77. This conclusion is intuitively valid and some data exists to support it. In a survey
covering 150 cases in which specific performance was denied on grounds of equitable
unfairness, the 56 responses showed that "[i]n every instance, an equitable defeat was a
total defeat." Frank & Endicott, Defenses in Equity and "Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv.
380, 381 (1954).
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defenses to specific performance differ from defenses at law, there are
in effect two doctrines regulating relief from contractual obligations,
"equitable" and "legal" unconscionability. Two features distinguish
the equitable version. First, courts often refuse to enforce contracts in
equity-that is, deny specific performance-on the ground that par-
ticular clauses are substantively unfair, without reaching the issue of
whether the contracting process itself was also unfair. Second, when
equity courts do require process unfairness as a condition of nonen-
forcement, their version of it seems different from and easier to estab-
lish than the process unfairness required in actions at law. These two
features are unjustifiable and produce confusion and unpredictability.
They should thus be abolished, so that the defenses that can be asserted
against a request for specific performance will be identical to those
that can be asserted against a request for damages.
1. A Too Low Price
A promisor can defeat an action for specific performance in some
jurisdictions by proving that the contract price is too low.78 Though
this defense is meant to rescue promisors from bad deals, it does the
job poorly. Suppose a party contracts to sell for $5,000 property that,
judging from sales of similar property, has a market value of $10,000.
Both specific performance and damages would impose a $5,000 loss on
the promisor in the event of breach. Now suppose instead that prop-
erty similar to the subject of sale is not commonly traded in the
promisor's area, but experts attest that the property at issue is "worth"
much more than $5,000. In this latter case, the breaching promisor
would prefer the promisee to be limited to a damage action. The
difficulty of measuring damages might cause a court to order the
promisor only to make restitution or to award a sum as damages that
is less than the value of the property to the promisor. Thus contracts
with allegedly inadequate prices are enforced when damages are
provable but not when damages are not provable.
There is no normative justification for making promisor protection
turn on the promisee's ability to establish damages rather than on the
price that the parties set. This difficulty can be avoided by making the
defense of a too low price generally available in contract law, or by
78. See note 8 suPra (citing cases in which specific performance was denied due to
inadequacy of consideration). Courts may grant specific performance, however, despite an
apparent inadequacy of consideration. See, e.g., Gross v. J & L Camping & Sports Center,
Inc., 270 Md. 539, 312 A.2d 270 (1973) (price was $85,000, value apparently above
$120,000); Blankenship v. Porter, 479 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1972) (price was $6,000, value
said to be $12,000).
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abolishing it. There are two principal reasons why the defense should
be eliminated entirely. First, the defense leads to unpredictable out-
comes. Unpredictability arises because the defense is often asserted in
cases involving goods for which no recognized markets exist. In con-
sequence, courts are often required to resolve the difficult issue of what
the property is "worth," as well as the more difficult issue of what
fraction of this worth justice requires the seller to receive. Because
judicial outcomes on these issues are difficult for the parties to predict,
promisors frequently assert the defense and thus force courts to spend
time considering it.79 Resources would be saved if the defense were
eliminated.
Moreover, contracts involving low prices should be enforced be-
cause enforcing such contracts creates incentives for promisees to seek
out good deals. Increased search, in turn, correlates positively with the
existence of competitive prices, for the more comparison shoppers
there are, the more likely it is that sellers can increase profits by offer-
ing lower prices.s0 Since competitive prices are preferable to supra-
competitive prices, the defense that a too low price alone ought to
bar specific performance should be eliminated.
Some courts allow the defense of inadequate consideration only if
there was also unfairness in the contracting process."' Because some
forms of process unfairness, such as misrepresentation, are inconsistent
with competitive outcomes, this version of the defense seems justifiable.
But the forms of process unfairness that support a denial of specific
performance should be the same as those that support a finding of
unconscionability at law. Otherwise, promisor protection does turn on
the promisee's ability to prove damages rather than on the unfairness
that actually occurred; if "equitable" unconscionability is easier for a
promisor to establish than legal unconscionability, the promisee will
sue at law if possible. Furthermore, since the factors that make up legal
unconscionability are themselves suspect,8 2 the vaguer equitable ver-
79. See, e.g., Loeb v. Wilson, 253 Cal. App. 2d 383, 388, 61 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1967)
(two expert real estate appraisers testified as to adequacy of consideration). In at least one
jurisdiction, a motion for specific performance must allege the value of the property in
order to allow the court to judge the adequacy of the consideration. See, e.g., Georgia
Money Corp. v. Monteleone Apartments, Inc., 223 Ga. 418, 418-19, 156 S.E.2d 39, 39-40
(1967).
80. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 35, at 640-51.
81. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brown, 130 Ill. App. 2d 514, 264 N.E.2d 287 (1970); Peters
v. Wallach, 366 Mass. 622, 321 N.E.2d 806 (1975).
82. See Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 293 (1975);
Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053
(1977); Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite
Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976).
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sion is even less attractive.8 3 Finally, having two versions of unconscion-
ability, both of which are unpredictable in application, generates ex-
cessive uncertainty costs. Thus, the standards of legal unconscionability
should furnish the guidelines for the process unfairness version of the
too low price defense.
2. Unfair Terms
The unfair contract terms defense is best discussed in the context of
an illustration. Consider the rule used in some jurisdictions that
specific performance is denied if the promisee's performance is in-
adequately secured.8 4 This defense is often invoked in the case of in-
stallment contracts that fail to require the promisee to give a purchase
money mortgage.85
Suppose a party contracts to sell property for $8,000 and the market
price has risen to $10,000 at the time of performance. Under the con-
tract, the price is to be paid in installments, but the promisee fails to
give security. The promisor then breaches. Though it appears at first
that the promisor would be indifferent between specific performance
and damages, the promisor would, in fact, prefer to pay damages. Al-
though the legal remedy deprives the promisor of the $2,000 incre-
ment in value, it permits him to sell the property to another on a
secured basis and thus be relatively assured of receiving the full price.
If the promisor instead were specifically required to perform, he would
be forced to sell to the original promisee on an unsecured basis. In-
deed, denial of the remedy in these circumstances seems to be a pareto
83. See Hutchins v. Honeycutt, 286 N.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 254 (1974); II J. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 400 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 378, Comment a, Illustra-
tions (1) and (4).
A good example of the vacuousness of equitable unconscionability is given in Morgan
v. Reasor, 204 N.W.2d 98 (S.D. 1973), in which the court refused to require specific
performance of a contract to exchange a ranch for an apartment complex. The sellers had
purchased a 3,362 acre ranch for $169,500, and reneged on an agreement to exchange it
for an apartment complex. The buyer had claimed that the complex would operate at a
profit, the chances of which were slight. The court explained:
[T]he evidence discloses that this Pennington County rancher was without under-
standing of a transaction of this nature and magnitude. There is such a lack of
competency on the part of the defendants as to have made it necessary that they
should have had protection and advice; these facts coupled with the circumstances
that the Reasors were misled as to the value of Whispering Sands, and that they, in
effect, were actually giving their ranch away is sufficient in our opinion to constitute
constructive fraud.
Id. at 109.
84. See note 9 supra (citing cases denying specific performance on grounds that
promisee's performance was inadequately secured).
85. Id.
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superior move;8 6 the promisee is as well off with damages as with the
property, while the promisor is better off if he is free to sell elsewhere
on more favorable terms.
If damages are undercompensatory, however, as is commonly the
case in suits for specific performance, promisors are made better off
but promisees worse off by the defense. Some courts attempt to take this
into account by granting specific performance if the promisee furnishes
a mortgage or other adequate security.87 This version of the unfair
terms defense, however, does not produce a pareto superior outcome;
instead, it inappropriately redistributes wealth from promisees to
promisors and creates uncertainty. Suppose in the earlier example that
the implicit price of a purchase money mortgage is $500.88 Then mak-
ing the grant of specific performance conditional on the promisee's
provision of a purchase money mortgage in effect raises the price of
the house, which would have been $7,500 in a secured sale. Yet courts
do not reduce the price when requiring a mortgage as a precondition
to specific performance. The resultant redistribution seems unjustified;
the promisee in this illustration was not guilty of process unfairness in
making the contract, yet the promisor receives a price increase because
he balked at completing a deal to which he freely agreed. 9 Further-
more, uncertainty is created because promisees would have difficulty
predicting actual transaction prices in the event of breach since the
parties seldom calculate implicit prices for terms such as mortgages at
the time the price is negotiated.
These arguments can be generalized to cover any contract term
challenged on fairness grounds. A court can either deny specific per-
formance altogether 0 or condition its grant on deletion of the offend-
86. For a definition of the concept of pareto superiority, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 441 (1976). In brief, solution A is pareto superior to solution
B if everyone is as well off under A as under B, and at least one individual is better off
under A. Id.
87. See, e.g., Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 838 (Alaska 1971); RESTATEMENT § 373.
88. An "implicit price" is the price that would have been charged for a contract term
or product feature if the parties had separately priced it. This example is more realistic
than the previous example, see p. 301 supra, which inaccurately presupposed that mort-
gages did not have implicit prices.
89. The Restatement unpersuasively justifies making grant of specific performance
conditional on the provision of security on the ground that "[t]here is no injustice to
the plaintiff in requiring the reduction of that risk [of nonpayment], as the price of
getting so drastic a remedy." RESTATEMENT § 373, Comment a. This argument ignores the
fact that increased risk in a transaction results in a higher price. Thus a decrease in risk
should result in a decrease in price.
90. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 378(l)(c) (specific performance will be denied if contract itself is unfair).
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ing contract term."' Both solutions are pareto superior to specific
performance when damages are fully compensatory. When damages are
not compensatory, the latter solution is preferable because the prom-
isor would be as well off with a conditioned grant as with denial of the
remedy, while the promisee in some cases would be better off. How-
ever, making grant of the remedy conditional is itself a questionable
response to the problem of unfair terms because it redistributes wealth
inappropriately and creates uncertainty.
The appropriate solution to the unfair terms problem in light of
these difficulties is to permit the conditional grant version of the de-
fense only if it is accompanied by unfairness in the contracting pro-
cess. The existence of such unfairness largely vitiates the objections
to the defense. First, any redistributions engendered by making the
grant of specific performance conditional seem justifiable; the promisee
has behaved inappropriately with the apparent result that the promisor
was influenced to make a worse deal than he otherwise would have
made. Second, while deals made on favorable terms should be enforced
so as to induce promisees to search for good deals and thereby promote
competitive outcomes, process unfairness often produces noncompeti-
tive outcomes. Third, uncertainty will be reduced because a promisee
not guilty of process unfairness knows that his deal will be enforced on
the original terms. Also, the process unfairness necessary to trigger
application of the unfair terms defense should be measured by legal
rather than equitable standards. 92
91. See, e.g., Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 839 (Alaska 1971) (grant conditional even
when promisor explicitly assumed risk of nonperformance by promisee); RMTATEMENT
§ 373, Comment b (same).
92. None of these objections apply to the rule that specific performance will be denied
if the promisee lacks "clean hands," that is, if he fails to perform in accordance with the
terms of the contract. See Fultz v. Graven, 7 Ill. App. 3d 698, 699, 288 N.E.2d 491, 491-92
(1972); Shannon v. Gull Lake Ass'n, 11 Mich. App. 644, 645, 162 N.W.2d 111, 111 (1968).
If a plaintiff fails so to perform, the contract itself bars his claim to the defendant's
performance.
The defense of unilateral mistake, however, is subject to the criticisms made of the
defense of unfair terms. Some courts deny specific performance if the promisor failed to
understand the terms of the contract even though the promisee did not conceal those
terms. See note 10 sukra. If one party takes advantage of the supposed ignorance or lack
of sophistication of the other party, the court may refuse to enforce the contract. See
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4)(e) (1974). Because this rule is itself open to
attack on the ground that a person's freedom to contract is unduly restricted if it is too
lightly presumed that he is incompetent, see Schwartz, supra note 82, at 1076-82, equity
courts should go no further. Some support for this argument is found in the fact that
some courts grant specific performance when the unilateral mistake could have been
prevented by the promisor's due diligence. See Tayyara v. Stetson, 521 P.2d 185, 189
(Colo. App. 1974); Van Curler Dev. Corp. v. City of Schenectady, 59 Misc. 2d 621, 628,
300 N.Y.S.2d 765, 775 (1969).
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B. Difficulty of Supervision
The difficulty of supervision defense largely rests on the assumption
that specific performance unduly raises administrative costs. 9 3 As in-
dicated above, the administrative cost objection is much less forceful
than is commonly supposed. This defense, however, also rests on a
related premise-that courts should not do ineffectual tasks. 94 When
the promisor wants to avoid performing, even a specific performance
decree may not cause him to render the promised performance satis-
factorily. Given this possibility, three arguments can be made in sup-
port of the difficulty of supervision defense: (i) the decree would not
be in the promisee's best interests; (ii) judicial prestige will suffer if
court decrees are flouted; (iii) courts should not waste judicial resources.
The first basis for the defense is untenable; it should be the promisee's
choice whether to risk the possible defects of a coerced performance.
Furthermore, the promisee is better able to assess the likelihood of
compliance than a court because the promisee knows more about the
promisor.
Although the second argument is based on a legitimate concern, it
does not support denial of the remedy. Because the costs to a promisor
of noncompliance with a court decree are likely to be high, and be-
cause business promisors seldom breach for ideological reasons, sub-
stantial compliance with most decrees can be expected. Further, the
typical contract law dispute is unlikely to attract publicity; con-
sequently, any noncompliance will not adversely affect the public per-
ception of the courts. In the event, however, that noncompliance seems
particularly likely in a given case, and the noncompliance is likely to
be publicized, a court could justifiably deny specific performance
under the difficulty of supervision defense.
The third argument also will rarely support denial of the remedy.
Judicial resources will not be wasted because a promisee is unlikely
to seek specific performance unless the gain-substantial compliance
93. For standard statements of the defense, see D. DOBBS, subra note 60, at 908-09;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 380. Courts in some jurisdictions grant specific performance even
though it involves extensive supervision. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522
F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1975); City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 776-78 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pembroke Park Lakes, Inc. v. High Ridge
Water Co., 213 So.2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. App. 1968).
94. The Restatement (Second) articulates this premise of the difficulty of supervision
defense:
Difficult questions may be raised as to the quality of the performance rendered
under the decree. Supervision may be required for an extended period of time.
Specific relief will not be granted if these burdens are disproportionate to the ad-
vantages to be gained from enforcement and the harm to be suffered from its denial.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 380, Comment a.
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Specific Performance
by the promisor-exceeds the associated costs. Moreover, as suggested
previously, much of the cost of supervision can and should be allocated
to the parties.
Thus arguments based on the premise that courts should refuse to
assume ineffectual tasks only support a quite restricted use of the
difficulty of supervision defense. There are cases in which the cost of
a master would be enormous in relation to the stakes at issue, in which
the court is aware that publicized noncompliance is likely, or in which
the plaintiff is seeking specific performance out of spiteful motives.
Although such cases are rare, courts should have the power to deny
specific performance when necessary. Ordinarily, however, even if a
court or master would have to engage in extensive supervisory tasks, a
promisee should have the option of requesting the remedy of specific
enforcement.9 5
Conclusion
The compensation goal of contract law can be achieved by requiring
the promisor to pay damages or by requiring the promisor to render
the promised performance. Under current law, a promisee is entitled
to a damage award as of right but the court retains discretion to decide
whether specific performance should be granted. Because specific per-
formance is a superior method for achieving the compensation goal,
promisees should be able to obtain specific performance on request.
An expanded specific performance remedy would not generate greater
transaction costs than the damage remedy involves, nor would its in-
creased use interfere unduly with the liberty interests of promisors.
Making specific performance freely available also would eliminate the
uncertainty costs of planning and litigation created by the difficulty of
predicting whether the remedy will be available. In addition, this re-
form would reduce the negotiation costs incurred by parties in at-
95. A defense related to the difficulty of supervision defense is uncertainty of terms.
Specific performance is denied when a contract's terms are too uncertain, even though the
uncertainty might not defeat a damage action. See, e.g., S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers
Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 180-81, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46-47 (1976);
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) § 376, Comment b. If the contract's meaning is unclear, a court
would have difficulty in framing a specific performance decree, but would also have
difficulty in making a damage award. Thus if a contract is not too uncertain to enforce
at law, it should be enforceable in equity. See W. WALSH, sutra note 22, at 329-30. A
more stringent standard of certainty might be required in equity on the ground that a
promisor may have a greater liberty interest in not being compelled to perform acts
than in not being forced to pay money. See pp. 296-97 supra. This justification is un-
satisfactory, however, because the liberty interest distinction between conveying property
or performing services and paying money is obscure.
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tempting to create forms of contractual specific performance such as
liquidated damage clauses.96 Further, defenses to requests for specific
performance that rest on unfairness of contract terms or prices and that
differ from the defenses in actions at law should be eliminated; the
grounds for denial of specific performance should be the same as those
that now will bar a damage suit. Finally, the defense based on difficulty
of supervision should be greatly restricted. If the law is committed to
putting disappointed promisees in as good a position as they would
have been had their promisors performed, specific performance should
be available as a matter of course to those promisees who request it.
96. This conclusion is similar to the conclusion Professor Fiss reached with regard
to injunctions:
I will urge that the traditional view give way to a nonhierarchical conception of
remedies, where there is no presumptive remedy, but rather a context-specific
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each form of relief. It should not
be necessary to establish the inadequacy of alternative remedies before the injunction
becomes available; at the same time, the superiority of the injunction should not be
presumed, but rather dependent on an analysis of its technical advantages and the
system of power allocation that it implies.
My plea is not confined to the civil rights injunction, but should extend to all types
of injunctions.
0. Fiss, THE CIvIL RI GHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978). Contract remedies also should be "non-
hierarchical," so that promisees need not "establish the inadequacy of alternative remedies
before" specific performance is available. Id. This Article's argument goes further toward
authorizing equitable relief than does Professor Fiss's analysis, both because of the clear
superiority of specific performance over damages in achieving the compensation goal and
because "a context-specific evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each form
of relief," id., shows that this superiority can usually be purchased at relatively slight, if
any, net cost.
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